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Abstract
Although Vietnam comprised a miniscule portion of the international coffee market during the 1900s, its
coffee production skyrocketed after the collapse of the ICA and surpassed Colombian production levels. This
unmatched increase attributed the drastic decline in world coffee prices to the oversupply of coffee from
Vietnam. Following the methods of Dodaro (1993), a Granger causality analysis between Vietnamese coffee
exports and ICO composite price produced neither forward nor reverse causality between these two variables.
Using the methodology of Carlin, Glyn, and Van Reenen (2001), labor productivity comparisons aimed to
explain the shift of coffee export volume from Colombia to Vietnam. Results demonstrated Colombia’s
consistently higher labor productivity, thus the disparity in realized comparative advantage does not explain
the shift in production. Although Vietnam’s success in coffee production accompanied the Colombian coffee
sector’s demise, a direct link between the two economies does not appear to exist. Vietnam’s success likely
arose simply from the culmination of relevant government policies, trade agreements, and the collapse of the
ICA.
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Through the consideration of historical events surrounding the 
restructuring of major coffee producers, this analysis predicted the rapid increase 
in Vietnamese coffee production as a significant causal factor in the recent decline 
in world coffee prices. Furthermore, this analysis hypothesized that the disparity 
between Vietnamese and Colombian comparative advantage is the prominent 
factor supporting the transfer of coffee export volume and market control between 
these two countries. The labor-intensive properties of the coffee crop suggest 
labor productivity as the needed measure to determine comparative advantage in 
coffee producing nations.  
Following the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in 
1989, the composition of the world’s coffee producers drastically shifted. 
Colombia was one of the largest coffee producers in the world, second only to 
Brazil; however, within ten years of the collapse, the Vietnamese coffee sector 
overtook Colombia to become the second largest world producer. Throughout its 
existence, the ICA imposed quotas on coffee production to artificially uphold the 
world coffee price. This created a tightly regulated coffee market in which non-
members, such as Vietnam, faced greatly limited production. After the collapse of 
the ICA, the coffee market became fully competitive and open to all producers. 
(Luong & Tauer, 2006) The Vietnamese government viewed this event as an 
opportunity to implement market-oriented policies that promoted free and global 
coffee production and competition. Vietnam’s coffee sector is widely believed to 
be the main cause leading to the coffee price crisis of 2001 due to its unmatched 
increase in coffee production between 1989 and 1999. (Luong & Tauer, 2006) 
 The following analysis focused on the coffee sectors of Colombia and 
Vietnam, as well as the events connecting these two large markets. Coffee 
production was relatively unimportant to the Vietnamese economy until the late 
1980s (Thang & Shively, 2008), yet this small country overtook one of the largest 
coffee producing nations in the world in a span of only ten years (see graph 1). 
The goal of this analysis was to determine whether Vietnam deserves the causal 
role in the world price decline, as well as the reasoning behind the radical shift in 
coffee export volume among producing nations.  
To accomplish this goal, this paper presents a Granger causality analysis 
to evaluate the possible existence and direction of causality between the increased 
Vietnamese coffee production and the declining world coffee prices. Furthermore, 
to examine the reasoning behind the radical shift in coffee production, this paper 
includes two analyses that compare labor productivity and cost competitiveness 
between Colombia and Vietnam in order to examine each country’s comparative 
advantage in the labor-intensive coffee sector. Specifically, the first analysis 
utilizes the Classical Model to determine which country should dominate the 
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 export market based on the relationship between each country’s labor productivity 
and wage rate. Whereas, the second model analyzes each country’s cost 
competitiveness in the coffee sector by examining the role of relative unit labor 
costs in determining its export market share. These two theories present different 
ways to determine the importance of labor productivity and comparative 
advantage in the reallocation of coffee export volume to the more productive 
country, which in this case is predicted to be Vietnam. The disparity in labor 
productivity between these countries would not be fully realized until the 1990s 
when the coffee market was deregulated, thus marking the importance of the 
collapse of the ICA in the vast reordering of producers in the international coffee 
market. 
This paper begins by presenting the historical background of the 
International Coffee Agreement, as well as the history of the Colombian and 
Vietnamese coffee sectors. The next section will present the motivation and 
methodology behind each analysis and is followed by a section of computations. 
The following section will present results and implications for each analysis, and 
lastly, there is a section of overall conclusions. 
 
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT 
 
 The international coffee market remained free of interventions before 
1900, but many coffee producing nations were experiencing detrimental economic 
impacts from the persistent fluctuation of coffee prices. These negative impacts 
provided incentives to intervene in the international coffee market in order to 
sustain the world coffee price. The Brazilian Federal Government implemented 
the first market intervention in 1921 by preventing the export of large stocks of 
coffee. This policy lasted until 1940, when after destroying 78 million bags of 
stored coffee in a span of thirteen years, Brazil dropped this costly policy and 
increased its exports to regain 63% of the world coffee market. Many Latin 
American countries, such as Colombia, directly benefited from Brazil’s reduced 
exports, thus they had little incentive to participate in an export reduction 
agreement. However, when the European countries banned all coffee imports 
during World War II, the negative impacts of low prices reverberated through all 
Latin American markets, thus initiating the producers’ interest in international 
market regulations. (Pieterse & Silvis, 1988) 
 After a series of failed producer-based price regulation agreements, the 
first International Coffee Agreement was signed in September 1963, including 
both coffee producing nations and the United States on the coffee consumer side. 
This agreement distributed export quotas to 36 producing nations based on their 
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 average exportable production in the previous four years and the application of a 
plan to reduce future production. Although well-intentioned, a policy allowing 
members to surpass production quotas by exporting coffee to countries that were 
not typically large coffee importers created a major loophole in this agreement 
that resulted in inadequacies in the regulation of coffee export volume and 
eventually led to the reevaluation of this ICA. The next ICA, signed in 1968, 
included several provisions holding members accountable for obeying the quota 
system. This ICA faced its demise in 1972 when the United States withdrew from 
the agreement after producers attempted to form a cartel to counteract the 
negative trend of export price that was caused by the depreciation of the dollar 
(the unit of denomination for coffee prices) against other major currencies. 
(Pieterse & Silvis, 1988) 
The next ICA was negotiated in 1976 and implemented quota restrictions 
only when the coffee prices fell below a certain level. This quota system was 
quickly rendered useless when unexpected situations in three major coffee 
producing nations allowed other nations to increase production past their quota 
limits in order to fill the coffee shortage. (Pieterse & Silvis, 1988) 
The most recent ICA, signed in 1983, covered 99% of the world coffee 
exports and utilized export restrictions to stabilize world market prices. The ICA’s 
reign severely limited the coffee exports from small non-member producers, such 
as Vietnam, since all coffee demand was met through the ICA controlled exports. 
The ICA provided member countries, such as Colombia, with appropriate coffee 
import demand at artificially created higher world prices. Under this ICA, the 
composite indicator price (CIP) was the main determining factor in the 
implementation of the quota system. When the 15-day moving average of the CIP 
moved out of the stabilization range of 1.20-1.40 US dollars per pound for a 
certain number of days, the quotas were automatically adjusted by fixed 
percentages depending upon how far out of the range the CIP had gone. (Pieterse 
& Silvis, 1988) 
Although many experts agree on the effectiveness of the ICA price band, 
the ICA’s underlying problems of free riding and quarreling over export quotas 
outweighed the benefits of the higher price. During the final ICA, low-priced 
trade with non-member countries progressively increased, thus fragmenting the 
market between the countries that followed their quotas and those that did not. 
Importing countries further undermined the principles of the ICA by seeking out 
cheaper coffee to fulfill excess demand during the lag before the stable ICA 
quotas could be adjusted. These and other problems culminated at such a level 
where the ICA was no longer feasible, thus it was allowed to collapse in 1989. 
(Ponte, 2001) 
After the collapse of the ICA, the world coffee price exhibited a new 
pattern of lower prices with much higher variability (see graph 2; Ponte, 2001). 
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 Although lower prices are typical after the collapse of a price-fixing scheme, the 
unanticipated high variability stemmed from the sudden loss of government 
involvement in coffee producing countries. During the reign of the ICA, many 
producing nations had high government involvement in their coffee sectors due to 
the countries’ heavy reliance on coffee exports as a main source of revenue. 
Along with the lack of government involvement, the instability of the coffee 
sector was exacerbated by the inability of many smaller grower organizations to 
effectively control the volume of coffee exports. This resulted in higher 
concentration of the coffee market since only the livelihoods of large growers 
could be sustained under the low coffee prices. Furthermore, the increased 
concentration directed more of the coffee income to remain in consuming 
countries while the producers received progressively smaller proportions of the 
income. (Ponte, 2001) During the height of this inopportune environment, 
Vietnam unexpectedly increased its coffee production to become one of the major 
coffee producers in the world. 
 
2.2 THE COLOMBIAN COFFEE SECTOR 
 
 Jesuit missionaries planted the first coffee plants in Colombia in 1732 (De 
Graaff, 1986). Colombia had ideal growing conditions for this cash crop due to its 
vast deposits of volcanic soil, mild temperatures, and abundant rainfall (Juan 
Valdez, 2008). Coffee production remained at fairly low levels in Colombia until 
a law was passed in 1821 that banned all coffee imports (De Graaff, 1986). 
Through this legislation, the Colombian government firmly established its 
prominent and lengthy role in coffee trade decisions. 
Although Colombia was the second largest world coffee producer for 
several decades, this coffee industry experienced several booms and busts 
throughout its development. The first Colombian coffee price crisis occurred 
during the 1920s, yet this crisis was quickly overcome when Brazil opted to 
withhold exports from the market in an effort to force the coffee prices to rise. 
Colombia utilized Brazil’s policy as an opportunity to expand its share of the 
coffee market and tripled its planted area and exports during this period of 
Brazilian price fixing. During the next bust in the coffee industry, Colombia 
joined many other coffee producing nations to form a quota system that ensured a 
higher price of coffee in the world market. Similar to the previous price crisis, this 
negative price trend reversed shortly after the conclusion of World War II, and by 
1954 coffee comprised 83% of total exports from Colombia. (De Graaff, 1986) 
Although Colombia’s dependence on coffee fluctuated over time, the 
implementation of advancing technology allowed Colombia to produce higher 
yields on the same plots of land. This discovery resulted in the furthering of 
Colombia’s dependence on coffee export revenue. The last major increase in 
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 cultivated coffee area occurred between 1975 and 1978 and resulted in an 
oversupply in the domestic economy given that the production level exceeded 
Colombia’s allotted export quota. (De Graaff, 1986) 
The Colombian coffee sector was unique from many other large coffee 
producing nations in that the government did not personally oversee the coffee 
sector; rather, it delegated all responsibility to a private non-profit entity called 
the National Federation of Coffee Growers (Federacafe). This non-profit entity, 
established in 1927, monitored and controlled the coffee sector through 
government contracts (De Graaff, 1986). Federacafe created the National Coffee 
Fund, which received revenues from coffee taxes and employed them to benefit 
the coffee farmers and develop the Colombian coffee industry. The Coffee Fund 
also protected compliant growers through a domestic minimum price, which 
assisted in the stabilization of farmer incomes despite any fluctuations in the 
world coffee price. (Juan Valdez, 2008) The effects of the post-ICA coffee crisis 
were felt across Colombia when the National Coffee Fund terminated this price 
stabilization, thus allowing the volatility in the internal market to increase and 
match the price volatility in the world market. (Giovannucci, 2002) 
The extensive direct and indirect government involvement in the 
Colombian coffee industry positioned the sector to face drastic changes in the 
structure of production and farmer involvement upon the retraction of government 
and other price assistance. During the reign of the ICA, coffee was produced on 
more than 300,000 farms ranging in size from 1 hectare to 100 hectares, yet more 
than 50% of the national coffee was produced on medium or large farms. Near the 
time of the ICA collapse, Colombian coffee officials promoted the cultivation of a 
new variety of higher-yielding coffee tree. Despite the good intentions of this 
policy, the tightening export quotas coupled with increasing coffee yields led to 
an oversupply of coffee in the domestic market. (De Graaff, 1986) 
In late 1989, the ICA collapsed, and its accompanying quota system was 
no longer relevant. This collapse encouraged coffee producing nations, including 
Colombia, to simultaneously export tremendous amounts of coffee on the world 
market. After the collapse of the National Coffee Fund and the ICA, the large 
growing organizations disappeared and the composition of producers shifted such 
that the majority of coffee trees were cultivated by over 500,000 independent 
coffee growers on small farms (Juan Valdez, 2008). The newly open world coffee 
market removed Colombia’s previous advantage of providing high volumes of 
steady high-quality coffee in favor of newer countries that produced adequate-
quality coffees at lower prices. These countries attracted significant portions of 
Colombia’s market in commercial blends, thus demonstrating that the Colombian 
coffee industry did not have the competitive advantage in producing this lower 
cost coffee, but rather in the production of a variety of high-quality coffee beans 
(Giovannucci, 2002).  
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 The negative impact of the removal of all protectionist measures became 
reality when the government began to promote crop diversification away from 
coffee. Following this promotion, coffee producers progressed toward on-farm 
diversification, thus demonstrating that both the government and the producers 
realized their lack of competitive advantage in an open market despite Colombia’s 
position as the second largest world coffee producer. Although the Colombian 
government encouraged diversification through financial policies and sector 
programs, these incentives led to the production of inefficient crops instead of 
other cash crops that could ease the country’s dependence upon coffee exports. 
(Giovannucci, 2002) Only ten years after the collapse of the ICA and prior to the 
termination of the National Coffee Fund, Colombia unexpectedly dropped in 
rankings of the world’s largest coffee producers, and became third to the 
previously insignificant Vietnam and Brazil (see graph 1).  
 
2.3 THE VIETNAMESE COFFEE SECTOR 
 
 Although coffee was not an important export commodity in Vietnam until 
the 1990s, the original coffee cultivation in Indochina began in the early 19th 
century and was organized by missionaries (Robequain, 1939, as cited in 
Doutriaux, Gesiler, & Shivley, 2008).  Throughout French colonial rule in 
Vietnam, coffee production occurred mainly on plantations as the French strongly 
encouraged the cultivation of coffee for export. Relative to lowland rice, the 
prominent export of the time, coffee cultivation proved to be more difficult than 
anticipated, which severely limited the expansion of coffee production. 
(Doutriaux et al., 2008) The majority of the original coffee trees in Vietnam were 
of the Arabica variety; however, the Hemileia vastatrix attacked the Arabica 
plants and depleted the output from 64.5% in 1945 to 1.7% in 1957 (Teulieres, 
1961, as cited in Doutriaux et al., 2008). The only coffee to survive this disease 
was the Robusta variety, Canephora, which is the type of coffee currently 
produced in Vietnam. After this disease eliminated nearly all of the coffee plants 
in Vietnam, the French colonial administration rescinded their encouragement of 
coffee cultivation and instead suggested that its inhabitants concentrate on annual 
crops such as rice (Doutriaux et al., 2008).  
After the end of French colonial rule in 1954, the new government in 
Vietnam began to again encourage coffee cultivation. In the late 1970s, the 
government provided incentives of clear and fertile land to induce the ethnic 
majority to migrate to the less populated highland region and produce coffee. 
(Doutriaux et al., 2008) This policy proved to be successful as seen in the increase 
in population density in the highlands from 3 persons per square kilometer in 
1940 to 77 persons per square kilometer in 1997 (Doutriaux et al., 2008). 
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 Through government encouragement, the cultivation of coffee transitioned 
from large plantations to large state owned farms and finally to small farmers with 
an average farm size of 1.2 hectares (Thanh & Shivley, 2008). Accompanying this 
shift toward small-plot land ownership, the Vietnamese government progressed 
toward a market-based economy, which in turn stimulated an exponential increase 
in coffee cultivation area and output (Doutriaux et al., 2008). The new market-
based economy and the increasing price of coffee on the world market attracted 
many new farmers to the Vietnamese highlands in the 1980s (see graph 2), thus 
increasing the number of planted coffee trees and the amount of output in the 
early 1990s. Between 1986 and 1996, coffee cultivation areas grew at the rate of 
21% annually, and yields grew 6% annually (Minot, 1998, as cited in Doutriaux et 
al., 2008).  By the late 1990s, between 85% and 90% of the planted coffee area 
was cultivated by small farmers (Luong & Tauer, 2006), thus exemplifying the 
success of the Vietnamese government policies in transitioning from large state-
owned farms to small market-based producers.  
The collapse of the ICA’s quota system further contributed to the 
increased coffee cultivation by removing all barriers on Vietnamese coffee 
exports and allowing the exportation of an unrestricted volume of coffee on the 
world market. Vietnam took full advantage of this favorable environment and by 
the late 1990s, coffee accounted for 6-12% of the total value of Vietnamese 
exports (see graph 3; Minot, 1998, as cited in Doutriaux et al., 2008). Vietnam’s 
dependence on coffee exports became evident early after the ICA collapse, when 
Vietnamese GDP increased at an average of 7.7% per year during the period 
between 1991 and 2001, Vietnam’s most prominent coffee exporting years 
(World Bank, 2002, as cited in Doutriaux et al., 2008). Although this increase in 
GDP was not a direct result of coffee exports, it is clear that Vietnam was 
becoming progressively dependent upon coffee as a main source of revenue as 
seen in the concurrent increase in GDP and coffee exports. 
 Accompanying the shift to a market-based coffee sector, the collapse of 
the ICA contributed the final factors necessary for Vietnam to experience the full 
economic impact of coffee cultivation. Prior to 1989, Vietnam’s market share was 
1.2% of the world coffee market. Only ten years after the collapse, the market 
share jumped to 12.4%, which made Vietnam one of the largest world coffee 
producers second only to Brazil. Coffee exports comprised the majority of 
Vietnam’s commodity exports at this time. (Luong & Tauer, 2006) The 
simultaneous government adoption of market oriented policies and the collapse of 
the ICA placed Vietnam in the prime position to expand the area under coffee 
cultivation, thus resulting in unprecedented increases in the output of Vietnamese 
coffee.  
 From their entry and exit analysis, Luong and Tauer (2006) argued that 
between 1994 and 1999, Robusta coffee prices remained consistently above the 
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 entry level price, which motivated Vietnamese producers to increase production. 
This new production resulted in an annual increase of 59% in planted area from 
1995 to 2000, which occurred during the drastic decline in ICO composite price 
(see graph 2). The consistently increasing production area in Vietnam during the 
period of dropping ICO price provided ammunition to blame Vietnam for the 
drastic and continuous decline in world coffee prices. In the same analysis, Luong 
and Tauer (2006) also argued that the Robusta price fell back toward the exit level 
price during the years of 2000 to 2002, which theoretically should induce 
Vietnamese producers to decrease the planting area. Yet, the Vietnamese 
increased their production area by 3,400 hectares in 2001. The constant growth in 
Vietnamese cultivation area even during theoretically unprofitable periods 
provides further support for previous ICA members when they attribute the cause 
of the dropping world coffee prices in the 1990s and early 2000s to Vietnam.  
Vietnam’s unexpected surge in coffee production, despite the existence of 
coffee in Vietnam for nearly two hundred years prior, indicates that the country 
must have held desirable coffee producing attributes that were not initially 
realized due to the limitations of market interventions. Although the altered 
government policy and the collapsed ICA contributed to the increase in 
production, Vietnam’s economy needed to possess the appropriate coffee 
characteristics in order to effectively take advantage of these events. Luong and 
Tauer (2006) described coffee as a labor-intensive crop because it involves the 
constant attention of labor forces throughout the year for different production 
stages, thus a large supply of labor is the main necessity in coffee cultivation. 
Vietnam had a large population in the late 1980s (63,263,000 people in 1988) 
which was readily available to migrate to the highlands at the suggestion of the 
government (The World Bank Group, 2006). These two conditions suggest that 
Vietnam may have had higher labor productivity than other coffee producing 
nations, which would give this country a wide advantage with this labor-intensive 
crop.  
 
3. MOTIVATION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 MOTIVATION  
 
 The drastic changes in Vietnamese coffee production throughout the 
1990s contributed to a significantly higher volume of coffee exports in the 
international market. Vietnamese coffee production historically comprised a 
relatively constant and small proportion of the world coffee market - 0.041% in 
1965 and 0.055% in 1984 - (FAO, 2008), thus minimizing the country’s impact 
on market price fluctuations (see graph 4). However, after the collapse of the 
International Coffee Agreement in 1989, Vietnamese coffee production 
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 skyrocketed to surpass Colombia’s export volume (see graph 1). Coffee 
producing nations have often blamed Vietnam for causing the recent coffee price 
crisis due to the fact that Vietnam was the only country to exhibit rapid increases 
in export volume after the ICA collapse (see graph 5).  
 Although Vietnam is often viewed as a causal factor in the world coffee 
crisis, a causal analysis to determine Vietnam’s true role has not been performed. 
The current paper conducted a Granger causality analysis to explore a potential 
causal relationship between the increase in Vietnamese coffee production and the 
decline in world coffee price (measured by the ICO composite price). The 
analysis included both forward and reverse causality.  
General microeconomics predicts the existence of forward causality, 
where an increase in supply leads to a reduction in price through the shifting of 
the supply curve along the demand curve (see graph 6). The coffee market is a 
mature market - the demand and consumption levels are relatively stable - and in 
this state coffee demand only changes under a significant increase in price (Ponte, 
2001). According to simple microeconomics, when the supply curve shifts to the 
right, it will move along the demand curve and the price will decrease due to 
relatively inelastic demand (see graph 6). Reverse causality posits that the 
decrease in world coffee price causes an increase in Vietnamese coffee 
production. Although this is an illogical pattern since a decrease in price does not 
typically encourage production due to the decrease in potential profits, Vietnam’s 
unique coffee export pattern provides motivation to test causality in both 
directions. 
 The increase in Vietnamese coffee production occurred after the collapse 
of the ICA in 1989, thus it is highly probable that the increase in production was a 
direct result of this collapse. Economic theories suggest that the disbanding of a 
price stabilizing mechanism, such as the ICA, negatively impacts member 
countries while non-member countries, like Vietnam, accumulate the benefits. 
The temporal proximity of the collapse and the increased Vietnamese coffee 
production complicates the ideal of placing causal blame on Vietnam for the 
plummeting world coffee prices. The fact that Vietnam was the only country to 
drastically increase its export volume after the collapse suggests the existence of 
another factor, such as comparative advantage, that assisted Vietnam in boosting 
its export volume at the expense of other nations. 
Ricardo’s comparative advantage theory suggests that a country should 
specialize in the production of goods and services that it can produce relatively 
most efficiently in order to maximize the gains from trade (Appleyard, Field, & 
Cobb, 2008). Labor productivity is often calculated to measure comparative 
advantage in a labor-intensive industry, such as the coffee sector. Following the 
Ricardian theory, if Vietnam had a comparative advantage in the production of 
coffee compared to all other goods, then under free trade, the production among 
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 countries would adjust to allow Vietnam to specialize in coffee production. This 
adjustment would occur because, under this assumption, Vietnam would be able 
to produce coffee relatively more efficiently than its trade partner in autarky, thus 
increasing its partner’s desire to trade with Vietnam (see graph 7). The 
hypothesized difference in comparative advantage between Colombia and 
Vietnam in graph 7 implies higher labor productivity in Vietnam, which would 
explain Vietnam’s increased coffee exports after the realization of free trade.  
 
3.2 THE GRANGER CAUSALITY ANALYSIS 
 
The Granger causality test implemented in this analysis was adopted from 
a previous study that examined the causality between export growth and GDP 
growth (Dodaro, 1993), which in turn acquired the methodology from Granger 
(1969). The equations presented in the paper are as follows: 
 
GYt = α + a1GYt-1 + a2GYt-2         (1a) 
GYt = α + a1GYt-1 + a2GYt-2 + b1GXt-1 + b2GXt-2        (1b) 
GXt = β + c1GXt-1 + c2GXt-2             (2a) 
GXt = β + c1GXt-1 + c2GXt-2 + d1GYt-1 + d2GYt-2         (2b) 
 
where GXt = (Xt  - Xt-1) / Xt-1 , GYt = (Yt – Yt-1) / Yt-1, and t = time. The 
corresponding measures of X and Y will be reassigned in the next section such 
that they are relevant to this analysis. The coefficients of these equations were 
calculated using an OLS regression with robust standard errors. In each case, the 
dependent variable is regressed against the past values of itself and the other 
variable. Similar to Dodaro (1993), this analysis specifies a two-year lag in each 
variable to allow a long enough period for a causal relationship to develop 
without losing too many degrees of freedom in the hypothesis testing. 
Specifically, this analysis estimated equations (1b) and (2b) using an OLS 
regression to determine if a causal relationship exists between the two variables. 
 The Granger causality analysis utilized hypothesis tests to test for joint 
significance of the one and two year lagged versions of the posited causal 
regressors. Specifically, when testing causality from X to Y, the hypothesis test 
examines the joint significance of the two lagged versions of X, and vice versa. 
Each type of causality – forward and reverse – has a specific regression model 
and thus requires a separate hypothesis test. The first scenario, equation (1b), 
presents a test to examine the causal relationship running from X to Y. In this 
case, letting Z1 = b1 + b2, with the null hypothesis, H0: Z1 = 0, one can use a t-test 
to explore the joint significance of b1 and b2.  
If Z1 is positive and significant, then H0 can be rejected, implying that the 
growth in X causes the growth in Y. Similarly, if Z1 is negative and significant, 
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 one can again reject H0, indicating that the growth in X hampers the growth in Y. 
The negative association implies that the two variables move in opposite 
directions through the causal relationship. In the current analysis, if X represented 
Vietnamese coffee exports and Y represented ICO composite price, then a 
negative Z1 portrays that an increased growth in the supply of Vietnamese coffee 
exports causes a decrease in the growth of ICO composite price. 
 Alternatively, in the second scenario, equation (2b), the regression model 
tests for a causal relationship running from Y to X. In this case, letting Z2 = d1 + 
d2, and creating the null hypothesis, H0: Z2 = 0, one can perform a t-test to explore 
the joint significance of d1 and d2. Similar to the previous interpretations, if Z2 is 
positive and significant, then H0 can be rejected, indicating a positive relationship 
in the form of Y causing X. Moreover, if Z2 is significant and negative, one can 
reject the H0, indicating a negative relationship in the form of Y causing X. In this 
analysis, with the values of X and Y as described above, a negative Z2 portrays 
that the decreased growth in ICO composite price leads to an increase in the 
growth of the supply of Vietnamese coffee exports.  
 Following Dodaro (1993), if both null hypotheses are rejected, there is a 
causal feedback system between the two variables. In the fourth scenario, neither 
null hypothesis can be rejected due to insignificant values of Z1 and Z2, thus no 
causal relationship is assumed to exist between these two variables.  
 Although Dodaro (1993) utilized an F-test in both hypothesis tests, the 
current analysis employed the t-test to test for joint significance of the one and 
two year lagged versions of the predicted causal regressor. In this case of testing 
for joint significance, the two variables – either b1 and b2 or d1 and d2 – can be 
treated as one variable, thus the results of the t-test and the F-test will be identical. 
Joint significance of these two variables indicates that the dependent variable has 
a causal relationship with the independent variables in the regression. The 
formulas used to compute the t-statistics in each scenario are detailed as follows: 
  
For the first null hypothesis, H0: Z1 = b1 + b2 = 0: 
t =
(b1 + b2) − 0
se(b1 + b2)
 where se(b1 + b2) = Var(b1 + b2)      (3a)   and  
 
Var(b1 + b2) =Var(b1) + 2cov(b1,b2) +Var(b2)             (4a) 
  
Similarly, for the second null hypothesis, H0: Z2 = d1 + d2 = 0: 
  t =
(d1 + d2) − 0
se(d1 + d2)
 where se(d1 + d2) = Var(d1 + d2)      (3b)   and 
 
  Var(d1 + d2) =Var(d1) + 2cov(d1,d2) +Var(d2)             (4b) 
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If the resulting t-statistics have an absolute value greater than the corresponding 
two-sided critical value for the t-distribution with the appropriate degrees of 
freedom, the null hypothesis can be rejected and Z1 or Z2 would be considered 
significant.  
 
3.3 LABOR PRODUCTIVITY COMPARISONS 
 
 Due to the variety in types of labor, the measure of labor productivity is a 
vague concept. Depending upon the source and availability of data, there are 
several suggested ways to measure this value, such as: Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) per worker, output per worker, and value added to GDP per worker (Carlin, 
Glyn, & Van Reenen, 2001; Ferreira & Rossi, 2003; International Labor 
Organization [ILO], 2009). The concept of ‘per worker’ represents the total labor 
force employed in the specific industry for which the labor productivity 
calculations are completed. (Carlin et al., 2001) 
 Data on the output per worker is unavailable in the coffee sectors of 
Colombia and Vietnam due to the fact that small farmers and their families 
conduct most of the coffee cultivation in both countries. These farmers do not 
have the resources needed to obtain an accurate measurement of the total number 
of workers in the field per day. To further complicate the availability of this data, 
migrant workers who travel around South America and work in temporary 
positions harvest much of the coffee in Colombia (De Graaff, 1986). It is unlikely 
that the Colombian government is able to gather accurate statistics on the number 
of people employed in the coffee sector in a given year since the majority of these 
employees will have moved onto employment opportunities in other countries or 
sectors. In Vietnam, the government strongly encouraged coffee production in the 
late 1970s by providing incentives to citizens who agreed to migrate to the 
highlands and produce coffee. Although the availability of coffee output data is 
still minimal, the calculation of the number of workers employed in Vietnamese 
coffee production is likely to be more accurate than in Columbia due to the 
government’s role in the recent initiation of coffee production. Vietnamese coffee 
production, contrary to the Colombian coffee sector, has not historically 
employed migrant labor during the harvest season.  
 Due to the limited availability of data for both the Vietnamese and 
Colombian coffee sectors, many of the measures used in the labor productivity 
and cost competitiveness calculations may not be completely accurate for either 
nation. Thus, proxies are utilized in the following analysis in place of the 
unreliable data. These proxies are described in detail in the following section. 
 Utilizing the methods presented in Carlin et al., (2001), this research 
included the following two analyses: labor productivity and the examination of 
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 cost competitiveness’ role in determining the export market share. Labor 
productivity for each country is defined as the division of value added in the 
coffee industry at constant 2000 US$ by the total employment in the coffee 
industry (Carlin et al., 2001). 
        
   Value added at constant 2000 US$  
 Labor Productivity = __________________________________________________          (5) 
                 Total Employment 
 
The labor productivity of Vietnam and Colombia are graphically presented by 
plotting labor productivity against the year. This visual representation facilitates a 
comparison of the labor productivity trends over time for both countries. 
Moreover, this analysis includes an examination of the annual growth in labor 
productivity for each country. According to Ferreira and Rossi (2003), positive 
growth in labor productivity results from a reallocation of output to the more 
productive firm. Thus, in this case, positive growth would indicate that coffee 
production had been reallocated to the more productive country.  
 In addition to this simple graphical comparison of labor productivity, the 
analysis followed the methods of MacDougall (1951) as presented in Appleyard 
et al. (2008) and utilized the Classical Model to predict which country should 
dominate the export market based on wages and labor productivity. Specifically, a 
nation should be more competitive in the world market when it has higher labor 
productivity relative to another nation, after accounting for the differences in 
wage rate. Applying MacDougall’s (1951, as cited in Appleyard et al., 2008) 
methodology to this analysis requires the following inequality: 
 
 
 Labor ProductivityVietnam  wVietnam 
         
____________________________________
     >      _____________            (6) 
 Labor ProductivityColombia                   wColombia  
 
Where w = wage. It is important to take the wage rate into account in this 
inequality due to the fact that wage rates vary greatly between nations, thus 
making it impossible to determine market dominance based solely on labor 
productivity. Following MacDougall’s (1951, as cited in Appleyard et al., 2008) 
results, if this inequality holds, Vietnam should dominate the coffee export 
market. If this inequality is reversed, Colombia should dominate the export 
market.  
 
3.4 COST COMPETITIVENESS 
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 According to Carlin et al. (2001), examining the role of cost 
competitiveness in the determination of export market share requires two 
components: a measure of export market share and a measure of competitiveness - 
relative unit labor costs. Export market share (XMS) represents the proportion 
that each country holds of the world coffee export market. This is calculated by 
dividing each country’s exports in current US dollars by the dollar sum of world 
exports. 
         countryj’s exports in current US$  
 XMSj =   __________________________________________    j = Colombia, Vietnam   (7) 
            dollar sum of world exports 
 
Although Carlin et al. (2001) applied this formula to several different industries 
within one country, the XMS value strictly measured the coffee export market 
share of Colombia and Vietnam (XMSCol and XMSViet, respectively) in the present 
analysis.  
According to Carlin et al. (2001), competitiveness is typically measured 
either by export prices or unit labor costs. The unit labor cost methodology is 
applied in this analysis due to the lack of coffee export price series data for either 
country. The relative unit labor cost (RULC) is a weighted average of the unit 
labor costs (ULC) in each country. In order to calculate RULC, data on employee 
compensation, employment, real output, and trade is needed. Specifically, the 
calculation of ULC is as follows: 
 
ULCj = (Wj / Ej)*(ejQj / Nj)          (8) 
 
Where W = employee compensation, E = number of employees, e = dollar 
exchange rate (national currency/US$), Q = volume of output (value added at 
constant prices), N = employment, and j = country. The RULC values are 
computed by dividing ULCj by a weighted average of the unit labor costs for both 
countries in the sample. Following the approach given by Carlin et al. (2001), the 
weighting factor is XMSj in 1995, thus the specific calculation is: 
 
        ULCj 
 RULCj =   _________________________________________________________          (9) 
       [XMSViet,1995*ULCViet + XMSCol,1995*ULCCol] 
 
The year 1995 was chosen as the weighting factor because it more accurately 
represents Vietnam’s unhindered share of the coffee market. The data prior to 
1990 is biased toward Colombia since Vietnam’s exports were highly restricted 
by the policies of the ICA during this period.  
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  These two calculations provide the necessary components of the cost 
competitiveness analysis. In order to examine the role of cost competitiveness in 
determining the export market share, one must regress RULC on XMS using the 
following econometric model: 
 
 log(XMSjt) = Σ αk log(RULC)jt-k + vjt  where k = 0, 1, …, L is a lag factor      (10) 
 
Although Carlin et al. (2001) utilized a five-year lag period, a two-year lag was 
chosen for the present analysis due to the limited number of data points and to 
maintain consistency with the lag time imposed in the Granger causality analysis. 
The specified models used in each analysis are presented in Appendices F and G. 
According to Carlin et al. (2001), the exogeneity of RULC can be assumed, thus 
an OLS regression was conducted in this analysis. The coefficients of this log-log 
econometric model represent elasticities of the dependent variable (XMS) with 
respect to each parameter (RULCj,0, RULCj,1, or RULCj,2). This model 
specification is used frequently in this type of analysis since it creates a constant 
elasticity. Moreover, if the estimated alpha values are negative, the model exhibits 
the expected negative effects of cost on export market share in the long run. 




4.1 PREPARING THE GRANGER CAUSALITY ANALYSIS 
 
 Prior to conducting the Granger Causality analysis, it is necessary to 
designate the measure to which each variable corresponds. In the current analysis, 
X represents the real price in 2000 of Vietnamese Coffee Exports and Y 
represents the ICO composite price. The Granger causality analysis examines the 
causal relationship between the growth of two variables, therefore it is necessary 
to compute the annual change in X and Y using the following equations: GXt = 
(Xt – Xt-1) / Xt-1 and GYt = (Yt – Yt-1) / Yt-1. If the estimated regression coefficients 
are significant, the growth in the explanatory variable influences the magnitude 
and direction of the growth of the dependent variable. The data for the ICO 
composite price was obtained from the “Historical Data” section of the 
International Coffee Organization’s website (International Coffee Organization 
[ICO], 2008). The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) provided publicly available data on the annual export volume and price per 
good per nation. The Vietnamese coffee export data was taken from the FAO 
statistics department’s website (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations [FAOSTAT], 2008).  
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  This analysis used the statistical software, STATA, in all regressions and 
calculations of the variance and covariance needed in order to conduct the 
hypothesis tests. The lagged variables were created by applying the growth 
equations given above (see appendix A.1 for full data sets). 
 
4.2 APPLICATION OF THE GRANGER CAUSALITY ANALYSIS 
 
The first regression examined forward causality, testing whether the 
increase in Vietnamese coffee production caused the decrease in the ICO 
composite price. The specific equation utilized in this regression is equation (1b), 
where X = Vietnamese coffee exports and Y = ICO Composite price. A 
significant negative value of Z1 would confirm the original hypothesis, which 
claimed that the increase in Vietnamese coffee production caused the rapid 
decline in ICO composite price. Appendix A presents the results of the STATA 
regressions and the corresponding t-test. As can be seen in this appendix, the t-
statistic, t = -0.8212 is not significant when compared to the two-sided critical 
value, t32,.05= ± 1.6939.  
 The second regression examined reverse causality, testing whether 
changes in ICO composite price caused the changes in Vietnamese coffee 
production. The original hypothesis did not predict any significant results in the 
reverse causality direction. If a significant test statistic was found, a negative 
value of Z2 would indicate that the decrease in ICO composite price caused the 
increase in Vietnamese coffee production. Appendix B presents the results of the 
STATA regressions and the corresponding t-test. The t-statistic presented in this 
appendix, t = .0046, is also not significant when compared to the two-sided 
critical value, t32,.05 = ±1.6939. 
 
4.3 APPLICATION OF THE LABOR PRODUCTIVITY COMPARISONS  
 
 The variables needed to precisely apply the labor productivity formula 
presented in the methodology section - the value added of coffee in constant US 
dollars and total employment in the coffee sector - are unavailable in both the 
Vietnamese and Colombian coffee sectors. The most specified form of agriculture 
value added is one step past the first ISIC classification, where agriculture was 
extracted from the ISIC’s ‘A’ classification, which represents agriculture, hunting, 
forestry, and fishing (ILO, 2008). In this analysis, Agriculture Value Added to 
GDP was used as a proxy for the coffee value added to GDP since the agriculture 
revenue of both countries relies heavily on coffee exports (see graph 8a and 8b). 
Similarly, the total employment in the coffee sector is an unknown value due to a 
lack of resources that are needed in order to accumulate this data. The World 
Bank World Development Indicators (2006) includes a measure of Agriculture 
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 Value Added (in constant 2000US$), as well as a measure of Agriculture Value 
Added per worker (in constant 2000 US$). This second variable is used as a proxy 
for labor productivity because among the available data it most accurately 
represents the value added per coffee worker in constant prices for each country. 
This labor productivity data and its graphical representation are presented in 
Appendices D.1 and D.2. 
Another important measure to examine is the annual growth in labor 
productivity. This measure is simply calculated by finding the percent difference 
in labor productivity between consecutive years for each country. These results 
are presented in Appendix D.4.   
 
4.4 APPLICATION OF THE CLASSICAL MODEL 
 
 The application of the Classical Model, as presented in MacDougall 
(1951, as cited in Appleyard et al., 2008, p. 53-57), required only two variables 
per country: labor productivity and wage per worker. The labor productivity 
measure for this analysis utilized the same proxy as given above, the World 
Bank’s (2006) Agriculture Value Added per worker. The coffee sector wage is 
calculated using the data on Price Paid to Producers from the ICO website (2008). 
This second measure is a representative proxy given that the majority of coffee is 
produced and harvested by small landowners in both countries. The results of this 
application are presented in Appendix E. 
 
4.5 APPLICATION OF THE COST COMPETITIVENESS ANALYSIS 
 
 Several of the variables used in the calculation of RULC required the use 
of a proxy due to unavailable or unreliable data. In the calculation of ULC, 
employee compensation and number of employees (W/E) were jointly 
approximated using the International Coffee Organization’s (ICO) measure of 
Prices Paid to Producers (ICO, 2008). The ICO’s data provided an accurate 
representation of the revenue producers receive for the production of coffee. This 
price varies between countries and type of coffee produced, Arabica or Robusta, 
thus it is not the same for Vietnam and Colombia.  The other portion of the ULC 
is calculated by dividing the exchange rate and value added by the employment in 
that sector (eQ/N). This measure is the same as the labor productivity calculation 
described above, thus (eQ/N) is approximated by the World Bank’s (2006) 
Agriculture Value Added per worker in constant 2000 US$. Appendix F presents 
the calculations of ULC for Vietnam and Appendix G presents the calculations for 
Colombia. 
 The XMS component of RULC did not require a proxy in these 
calculations. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations 
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 provides data on country specific and worldwide export commodities in terms of 
1,000 US$ and tonnes (FAO, 2008). The XMS values in Appendices F and G 
represent each country’s actual share of the world coffee export market. Although 
this is the only component of RULC without a proxy, it is important to avoid 
approximating this value since the examination of the temporal trends in each 
country’s export share is the main focus of this research. The major share that 
coffee comprises of each country’s agriculture market supports the use of the 
approximations described above in conjunction with the true values of XMS (see 
graphs 8a and 8b). Appendices F.1 and G.1 include the final calculations of 
RULC using this combination of true and approximated variables.  
 The STATA output from the OLS regressions of the two-year lagged 
econometric models is provided in Appendices F.2 and G.2. In order to test for 
the significance of relative unit labor costs in determining the export market 
share, an F-test was conducted for each country. This specific F-test explores the 
significance of the model by determining if at least one of the parameters has a 
coefficient that is significantly different than zero. The output in Appendix F.2 
demonstrates that relative unit labor costs are a significant determinant in export 
market share for Vietnam (F-stat =3.60, p = 0.0406, R2=0.4358) at the 0.05 
significance level, but not for Colombia (F-stat = 0.31, p=0.8175, R2=0.0624; see 




 The inability to reject either null hypothesis in the causality analysis 
demonstrates that there is no causal link between these two variables. Although 
contrary to the original prediction, there is not enough evidence to blame the 
coffee price crisis on the Vietnamese government policies that promoted the rapid 
development of coffee production in Vietnam’s Central Highlands. According to 
the labor productivity analysis, Colombia has consistently higher labor 
productivity than Vietnam. This productivity remained higher in the years after 
the ICA collapse, which was the first time that Vietnam’s coffee comparative 
advantage could be realized. The Classical Model analysis claims that Colombia 
should dominate the coffee export market. However, the cost competitiveness 
model suggests that Vietnam’s export market share has a negative association 
with its relative unit labor costs.  
 
5.1 DID THE INCREASE IN VIETNAMESE COFFEE PRODUCTION LEAD TO A DECREASE 
IN WORLD COFFEE PRICES? 
 
 The results suggest that there is not enough evidence to conclude that the 
increase in Vietnamese coffee production caused the decrease in world coffee 
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 prices (see Appendix A). The value of Z1 is negative, yet it is highly insignificant 
since the t-statistic, t = -0.8212, is smaller in magnitude than the two-sided critical 
value at both the 5% and 10% significance levels (t32,.025 = ±2.0369 and t32,.05 = 
±1.6939, respectively) with 32 degrees of freedom. According to Dodaro (1993), 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, which suggests that the decline in world 
coffee price was likely caused by factors other than the increase in Vietnamese 
coffee production.  
 Although simple microeconomics suggests that an increase in supply 
causes a decrease in price under inelastic demand (graph 6), one can assume that 
the collapse of the ICA was a major factor in the drastic decline in coffee price. 
The simple microeconomic concept of price decreasing after a supply curve shifts 
to the right does not exactly apply under the existence of market interferences. 
The coffee price had been artificially upheld for most of the 20th century by 
various versions of the ICA, thus the true equilibrium price of coffee throughout 
this period is difficult to predict. This complicates the ability to blame Vietnam 
for causing the price drop. It is likely that the decline occurred because the coffee 
market was progressing toward the equilibrium that had not been allowed to 
naturally occur in nearly a century.  
The collapse of the ICA also removed all export quotas. Several countries, 
including Vietnam, took advantage of this altered policy and increased their 
supply of coffee on the world market. Although Vietnam was a major contributor 
to the oversupply of coffee in the international coffee market, it was not the only 
country to increase export volume after the restrictions were removed (see graph 
5). The insignificant Granger coefficients denote that there is not enough evidence 
to conclude that the increase in Vietnamese coffee production caused the decline 
in world coffee prices. This result suggests that other coffee producing nations 
should not blame Vietnam for the decreased prices. Rather, they can more 
accurately attribute the plummeting world prices to a general move of the ICO 
composite price toward equilibrium with the newly expanded export volume and 
lack of market interferences.  
 
5.2 DID THE DECREASE IN WORLD COFFEE PRICES LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN 
VIETNAMESE COFFEE PRODUCTION? 
 
 The t-statistic presented in Appendix B is not significant since this value, t 
= 0.0046, is smaller in magnitude than the two-sided critical value at both the 5% 
and 10% significance levels (t32,.025 = ±2.0369 and t32,.05 = ±1.6939, respectively) 
with 32 degrees of freedom. Following the methodology presented in Dodaro 
(1993), the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, thus indicating that there is not 
enough evidence to conclude that the growth of Y caused the growth of X. This 
signifies that the growth in ICO composite price did not influence the growth in 
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 Vietnamese coffee production. This analysis originally predicted an insignificant 
test statistic in the reverse causality analysis due to the fact that the causal pattern 
is illogical according to any current economic theories. The value of Z2 in this 
hypothesis test is positive, yet this is of no concern, as it is highly insignificant. 
Therefore, the original hypothesis of insignificant reverse causality is supported.  
 Although this pattern of causality is not significant, it is important to 
determine the reasons behind Vietnam’s continuously increasing coffee export 
volume throughout this period of consistent declines in the ICO composite price. 
A factor in this unique pattern could be the existence of a lag between planting 
new trees and the actual increase in coffee production (Ponte, 2001). If the 
Vietnamese began planting more trees in the year of the ICA collapse, there 
would be a three-year gap before any drastic production increases would be seen 
in the export market. This could discourage continued increases in production 
since the country would have received low prices for its initial crop of expanded 
coffee exports.  
However, the Vietnamese export rates increased immediately after this 
collapse since the ICA’s quotas regulated only the amount of coffee exported (see 
graph 1), which suggests that the initial increases in production occurred prior to 
the ICA collapse. Vietnam had access to an unregulated coffee market for the first 
time since small farm coffee production began in Vietnam, and thus had the 
opportunity to export any excess stored green coffee that had been restricted 
under the ICA. However, the fact that the export rates increased so drastically 
even after the price began to drop in 1995 suggests the existence of another reason 
behind the Vietnamese government’s continued concentration of land and labor 
on a commodity with plummeting world prices.  
 
5.3 POST-ICA GRANGER CAUSALITY ANALYSIS 
 
 Under the reign of the ICA, Vietnam’s coffee export volume faced strict 
regulation and nearly all coffee demand was fulfilled by exports from ICA 
member countries. The existence of this quota system produced a Vietnamese 
export volume that underrepresented the country’s coffee supply. Similarly, the 
ICA artificially upheld the price, which would limit any causality between 
Vietnamese coffee production and ICO composite price during the reign of the 
ICA since the price was not allowed to move freely. In order to test for the casual 
relationship under a relatively open market, a post-ICA Granger causality analysis 
was conducted. The methodology and hypothesis testing correspond to the 
methods used in the previous Granger analyses; however, the data set in the 
regression only includes price and export data since 1990. 
 Although Vietnam’s export volume increased while the ICO composite 
price simultaneously decreased, this post-ICA analysis demonstrates insignificant 
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 forward and reverse causality (t9,.05=-1.8331 < t = 0.404 < t9,.95= 1.8331; and 
t9,.05=-1.8331 < t = 0.889 < t9,.95 = 1.8331, respectively; see appendix C). By 
failing to reject the null hypothesis test in both of these regressions, there is not 
enough evidence to conclude that the increased coffee production in Vietnam 
after the collapse of the ICA caused the decreased ICO composite price. 
Therefore, Vietnam does not hold a significant causal role in the decreasing ICO 
composite prices under ICA regulation or in an open market.  
 
5.4 DID VIETNAM HAVE HIGHER LABOR PRODUCTIVITY THAN COLOMBIA IN THE 
COFFEE SECTOR? 
 
Despite Vietnam’s lack of causality in the declining world coffee prices, 
the unexpected shift of coffee production from Colombia to Vietnam provides 
motivation to explore the factors behind this new production structure. The 
increase in Vietnamese coffee exports negatively impacted the Colombian 
economy by removing a portion of its coffee export volume, which was the main 
source of its export revenue at the time.  
The labor productivity calculations display Colombia’s consistently higher 
labor productivity over time (see Appendix D.1 and D.2). Although Vietnam’s 
labor productivity presents a general increasing trend, it does not approach a 
comparable level to Colombia’s labor productivity. The extreme disparity 
between the two nations’ productivity raises concern regarding the validity of the 
proxy used in these calculations. The proxy used, Agriculture Value Added per 
worker, is likely to be partially representative of the coffee sector since this sector 
comprises a large share of agriculture in both economies (see graphs 8a and 8b). 
However, this measure is calculated by dividing output by the total number of 
workers in that sector, wherein the problem lies. As previously discussed, migrant 
workers harvest most of the Colombian coffee, and these workers are unlikely to 
be accounted for in any measure of employment in these coffee sectors.  
This concern is further validated by the data on the percentage of labor 
force employed in the Colombian agricultural sector from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (2006) (see graph 9). This percentage is 
approximately 1% for two decades, and then jumps up to 20% in the early 2000s. 
Based on the history of the Colombian coffee sector, this drastic gap is illogical 
given that the country focused more on coffee and agriculture before 2000.  
The World Bank’s (2006) data on the percentage of labor force employed 
in the Vietnamese agricultural sector is likely to be more accurate due to the 
government’s motivating measures that encouraged the production of coffee. The 
government’s involvement in coffee production increases the probability that the 
government created more accurate statistical measures that are used to monitor 
the coffee sector. More accurate statistical methods would identify a greater 
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 number of laborers in the production of crops, which in turn would lower the 
labor productivity value since the output would be spread over a larger number of 
workers.  
Furthermore, from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(2006), the majority of Vietnam’s population is employed in the agriculture sector 
(see graph 9). This large percentage of agricultural workers could reduce the 
accuracy of using the Agriculture Value Added per worker as a proxy for the 
Vietnamese coffee sector. The majority of Vietnam’s citizens are working to 
produce some type of agricultural crop, thus it is possible that the productivity of 
the less efficient crops is affecting the labor productivity measure of the more 
efficient crops, such as coffee and rice. Other agricultural crops that require a 
higher amount of labor per unit output may reduce the overall agriculture value 
added per worker. Without accounting for the differences in number of workers 
and output among Vietnam’s crops, it is impossible to determine if the proxy is 
applying a downward bias to the labor productivity calculations. A downward 
bias, in this case, would suggest higher actual labor productivity for the coffee 
sector through either a higher output or lower number of workers than is indicated 
by the proxy. In the future, labor productivity should be calculated using data 
specific to the coffee industry in order to avoid the described limitations.  
Despite Colombia’s consistently higher labor productivity, Vietnam’s 
labor productivity displays a comparatively steady pattern of positive growth after 
the collapse of the ICA (see Appendices D.3 and D.4). Although this growth did 
not significantly narrow the gap between Vietnamese and Colombian labor 
productivity levels, labor productivity growth indicates that output was 
reallocated to the more productive producers (Ferreira & Rossi, 2003). Following 
this logic, Vietnam may have been attracting production away from Colombia 
even though Colombia had higher absolute labor productivity. From Appendix 
D.4, it can be seen that Colombia did not have any periods of steady positive 
growth, which supports the idea that output could transfer to the more productive 
producer. However, Vietnam also experienced volatility in productivity, although 
slight in comparison to Colombia, thus, one cannot firmly conclude that 
differences in labor productivity growth resulted in the transference of output 
from Colombia to Vietnam.   
 
5.5 DOES THE CLASSICAL MODEL ACCURATELY PREDICT THE CONTROLLER OF THE 
EXPORT MARKET? 
 
 The comparison of the ratio of labor productivities between Vietnam and 
Colombia to the ratio of wages between these two countries produces results 
contrary to the original prediction. According to MacDougall (1951, as cited in 
Appleyard et al., 2008), the ratio of labor productivities should be larger than the 
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 ratio of wages in order for Vietnam to dominate the coffee export market. 
However, the table in Appendix E indicates that the labor productivity ratio has 
been consistently smaller than the wage ratio since 1985, which suggests that 
Colombia should dominate the export market.  
 This analysis also utilized Agriculture Value Added per worker as a proxy 
for labor productivity. The lack of accurate worker counts and the lack of 
differentiation between agricultural subsectors complicates the ability to claim 
accuracy for this proxy. The Prices Paid to Producers remains a fairly accurate 
method to estimate wages since it describes the typical income received per 
producer on each coffee farm. Overall, the inability to examine the Value Added 
Per Worker in the coffee sector severely limits the accuracy of this comparison. 
However, the general decreasing trend in the difference between the ratios 
supports Vietnam’s continued increase in export market share (see Appendix E). 
Thus, if this analysis is repeated in the future using strictly coffee value added, it 
is likely that the Classical Model could correctly predict Vietnam’s export market 
dominance over Colombia.  
 
5.6 DOES COST COMPETITIVENESS DETERMINE A COUNTRY’S EXPORT MARKET 
SHARE? 
 
 The OLS econometric model examined the relationship between a 
country’s cost competitiveness (RULC) and its export market share. Specifically, 
the model tested for the role, if any, that cost competitiveness had in determining 
export market share. Both the Colombian regression and test of significance of the 
model produced insignificant results. There is not enough evidence to conclude 
that the elasticity of Colombia’s coffee export market share (log(XMS)) is 
impacted by the elasticity of cost competitiveness (log(RULC)) in the coffee 
sector. The model utilized several data proxies, indicating that the insignificant 
results could be influenced by a non-representative proxy. Moreover, the concerns 
regarding the labor productivity calculations also apply to this analysis as labor 
productivity (eQ/N) is a term in the regression model. This econometric model 
does not control for any country-specific factors, so it is highly probable that other 
factors are influencing the coefficients of the RULC terms.  
This regression did not produce a significant result, hence it cannot be 
claimed that the relative cost competitiveness is a major determinant in 
Colombia’s coffee export share. However, the notable limitations could severely 
bias the results of this analysis. As mentioned, the lack of a significant 
relationship between RULC and XMS in Colombia is likely to be a result of poor 
data and unrepresentative proxies. After the initial impact of the coffee price 
crisis, the Colombian government encouraged diversification among crops. The 
use of Agriculture Value Added per worker as a measure of labor productivity 
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 could bias the RULC calculations since these workers would still be in the 
agricultural sector, but not in the coffee realm.  
Secondly, the increased prevalence in the Colombia drug trade post-ICA 
initiated the calculation of several inaccurate statistics due to the existence of a 
“black market” on which this trade occurs (see graph 10). Many workers may 
have switched to this other “cash crop” in hopes to regain their livelihood, yet this 
switch could have resulted in an inaccurate measure of the agriculture labor force. 
Although this is merely a conjecture, it is possible that these two factors 
contributed to the relatively stable RULC in the agriculture sector and minimized 
the appearance of any shifts in the coffee sector’s RULC. However, the fact that 
the RULC and labor productivity measures are fairly consistent over time 
suggests that the ICA collapse explains Colombia’s drop in export market share 
(see graph 1).  
 Contrarily, the OLS regression produced significant results at the 0.05 
level for Vietnam. The significance implies that the elasticity in cost 
competitiveness (log(RULC)) significantly influences the elasticity of Vietnam’s 
export market share (log(XMS)). Two of the estimated coefficients are negative, 
which produces a negative relationship between log(XMS) and the sum of 
log(RULCk). As described in Carlin et al. (2001), these expected negative values 
show the negative effects of cost on market share in the long run. Specifically, 
since cost competitiveness is measured in relative terms (RULC), when the cost 
of production increases in Colombia, all other things equal, Vietnam experiences 
a drop in RULC, and thus an increase in market share.  
 Assuming that the model is correctly specified, it can be concluded that 
the Vietnamese export market share is moderately influenced by its relative unit 
labor costs in agriculture (R2=0.4358). After the collapse of the ICA, Vietnam 
realized its full competitiveness in the coffee market, which had been minimized 
by the ICA’s quota system. Graphs 11a and 11b display Colombia’s fairly stable 
relative unit labor costs over time, while Vietnam portrays a decreasing trend. 
This trend indicates that the Vietnamese agricultural unit labor cost decreased 
relative to the Colombian unit labor costs. According to Carlin et al. (2001), this 
drop in relative cost – a decline in external competition – resulted in immediate 
improvement in Vietnam’s export market share (in tonnes), which is portrayed in 
graph 1.  
 The RULC measure represents each nation’s cost competitiveness in the 
coffee market. This measure is similar to comparative advantage in that it 
measures the relative cost for each country to produce coffee. Comparative 
advantage tends to be a fairly stable statistic for a country over time; however, 
Vietnam is a unique case. Vietnam’s coffee exports were limited in the world 
market until after the ICA collapse, which is when its relative cost 
competitiveness in the coffee sector could be realized for the first time. Although 
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 the Vietnamese regression indicates a moderate relationship between RULC and 
export market share, it cannot be concluded that Vietnam’s realized comparative 
advantage explains the shift in coffee production from Colombia to Vietnam. 
Colombia’s export market share falls markedly after the ICA collapse (see graph 
1), yet its relative unit labor costs remain fairly stable. This observation supports 
the insignificant regression results for Colombia (R2=0.0624). 
 Although no strong conclusions can be made from this cost 
competitiveness analysis, the fact that Vietnam’s unit labor costs relative to 
Colombia produced a decreasing trend while its export market share increased 
indicates that under the realization of free trade some output may have initially 
transferred between countries. However, the fact that Colombia did not display 
the opposite pattern of increasing RULC with decreasing export market share 
complicates the ability to claim that realized relative unit labor costs explained the 




 The coffee plant has existed in Colombia and Vietnam for nearly two 
hundred years, yet these two countries experienced vastly different economic 
impacts and trends in their respective coffee sectors. Specifically, Colombia was a 
member of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), thus its coffee sector 
flourished throughout the 1900s due to appropriate import demand and artificially 
stabilized world coffee prices. Vietnam, however, was not a member of the ICA, 
which resulted in a narrow market and limited coffee export volume. After the 
collapse of the ICA in 1989, these two countries interacted for the first time in the 
international coffee market. 
 Upon receiving unhindered access to the international market, Vietnam 
increased its previously insignificant coffee exports and overtook Colombia’s 
share of the coffee export market. This unprecedented increase shocked the 
world’s coffee producing nations as Vietnam had held only minimal portions of 
the world market prior to the collapse. As a result of the rapid increases in export 
volumes from all producing nations, oversupply was created in the world market, 
which imposed detrimental impacts upon the nations whose economies relied 
heavily on coffee export revenue, such as Colombia.  
 This paper conducted three main analyses to examine Vietnam’s role in 
the international coffee market: a Granger causality analysis, labor productivity 
comparisons, and the influence of cost competitiveness on the country’s export 
market share. The Granger causality analysis did not produce significant results 
for forward, reverse, or post-ICA causality. The original hypothesis, which 
predicted significant forward causality, led to insignificant results, suggesting that 
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 there is not enough evidence to conclude that the increased exports caused the 
drop in world prices, thus the original hypothesis is not supported.  
 The labor productivity of each country’s coffee sector was calculated in 
order to compare the countries’ comparative advantages in coffee production. The 
original hypothesis predicted that Vietnam would have higher labor productivity 
than Colombia, which would motivate trade partners to prefer trade with Vietnam 
to Colombia due to the existence of greater potential gains. Labor productivity, 
and thus comparative advantage, is a relatively stable measure over time; 
however, Vietnam’s comparative advantage was effectively barred from the 
international coffee market during the reign of the ICA. The realization of 
Vietnam’s comparative advantage post-ICA was predicted to explain the shift in 
export volume from Colombia to Vietnam.  
 The labor productivity comparisons displayed Colombia’s consistently 
higher labor productivity in the coffee sector, thus providing no support for the 
original hypothesis. By examining annual labor productivity growth, results 
demonstrated that Vietnam had increasing and less volatile trends in labor 
productivity, yet this is not enough to conclude the significance of comparative 
advantage in explaining the shift in export volume between countries. The 
Classical Model’s comparison of the labor productivity ratio to the wage ratio also 
presented results contrary to the original hypothesis.  
 Similarly, the analysis of the influence of cost competitiveness on export 
market share did not provide the anticipated results. Although this regression 
produced significant results for Vietnam (F = 3.60, p = 0.0406, R2 = 0.4358), the 
lack of significant Colombian results indicates that no strong conclusions can be 
made regarding the role that relative unit labor costs hold in determining the shift 
of coffee exports from Colombia to Vietnam. Thus, it can be concluded that the 
original hypothesis regarding labor productivity’s role in explaining the transfer 
of coffee export volume is not supported.  
 Although no significant or predicted results were obtained in this paper, 
the Classical Model displayed trends toward explaining the observed shift in 
world coffee exports. In the future, heeding the limitations discussed, it is likely 
that an analysis examining the true labor productivity of the Colombian and 
Vietnamese coffee sectors would produce results from the Classical Model that 
correspond to the events observed in reality.  
 Without further research, no conclusions can be made regarding 
Vietnam’s role in the world coffee market. During the reign of the ICA, 
Vietnam’s coffee production comprised a miniscule portion of its export revenue, 
thus coffee was considered relatively unimportant to the country. However, the 
government provided incentives in the late 1970s that motivated citizens to 
increase the coffee production (Doutriaux et al., 2008). The government, 
previously communist, also progressed toward a market-based coffee sector, 
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 which further encouraged the production of coffee on small farms (Doutriaux et 
al., 2008). To accompany this increased production and shift toward a market 
based economy, the ICA collapsed in 1989, thus placing Vietnam in the prime 
position to take advantage of the newly opened market. 
 After escaping from the rigidities of a centrally-planned economy, many 
more coffee importing nations were willing to engage in trade with Vietnam. 
Specifically, Vietnam became a member of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
and signed the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement in December 2001, which 
led to significantly more changes in Vietnam’s trade regime (The Central 
Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2009). The culmination of these three main events – 
government encouraged market-based coffee production, the collapse of the ICA, 
and the increased willingness of other nations to trade with this no longer 
communist country – placed Vietnam in the right place at the right time. Although 
it cannot be determined, it is likely that this coincidence is what truly explains the 
reason behind Vietnam’s unique drastic increase in world coffee exports. 
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 Graph 1. 
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Graph 3.  
(a) 
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Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations: Statistics Department  
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of 
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Graph 4.  
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 Graph 7. 
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Coffee Other Commodities 
Colombia 1/3  3 Vietnam 1/5 5 
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According to this example of comparative advantage, both Colombia and 
Vietnam have a comparative advantage in the production of coffee over the 
United States. Although Colombia and Vietnam both have absolute advantage in 
the production of coffee and all other commodities (assuming this example is 
correct), the two trading partners, in both scenarios, stand to gain from trade if 
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 they each specialize in the good that they can produce with the lowest opportunity 
cost. In comparing these two scenarios, the United States has a better chance to 
gain from trade by trading with Vietnam, because “the closer the terms of trade 
are to a country’s internal autarky price ratio, the smaller the gain for that country 
from international trade” (Appleyard et al., 2008, p. 32). If the United States 
traded with Colombia, the terms of trade would fall between Colombia’s autarky 
price ratio, 1/3, and the United States’ autarky price ratio, ½. If the United States 
traded with Vietnam, the terms of trade would fall between Vietnam’s autarky 
price ratio, 1/5, and the United States’ autarky price ratio, ½. The second case is a 
larger interval in which the terms of trade could fall, thus the United States has a 
greater chance of gaining more from trade by trading with Vietnam. If this 
example were correct in reality, then the United States, and any other coffee 
importing nation, would choose to import coffee from Vietnam over Colombia 
after the collapse of the ICA due to the potential for greater gains from trade.   
 Specifically, if Vietnam had originally been barricaded from participation 
in international trade, upon gaining access to the market, many nations would 
choose to trade with Vietnam over Colombia since Vietnam’s comparative 
advantage offers greater potential gains from trade. Neither country’s comparative 
advantage would change over time; however, it is only after the removal of trade 
barriers that potential trade partners could realize the disparity between 
Vietnamese and Colombian comparative advantage. This newly realized disparity 
would motivate importing countries to shift from Colombia to Vietnam in order to 
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 Graph 8.  
(a) 


























































































































































































































Source: Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations: Statistics Department 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations: Statistics Department  
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 Graph 9.  
 
Published Data for Percentage of Labor Force Employed in Agriculture 
 
Year    Colombia (%)    Vietnam (%) 
 
 
1985    1.399999976     - 
1986    1.399999976     - 
1987    1.399999976     - 
1988    1.299999952     - 
1989    1.299999952     - 
1990    1.399999976     - 
1991    1.299999952    74.69999695 
1992    1.399999976    72.80000305 
1993    1.100000024    71.59999847 
1994    1.299999952    70.00000000 
1995    1.000000000     - 
1996    1.200000048    70.00000000 
1997    1.000000000    65.30000305 
1998    1.000000000    64.80000305 
1999    1.100000024    65.00000000 
2000    1.100000024    65.30000305 
2001    22.20000076    64.00000000 
2002    20.39999962    62.00000000 
2003    21.10000038    59.70000076 
2004    20.29999924    57.90000153 
2005    22.39999962     - 
Source: The World Bank Group World Development Indicators 
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 Graph 10. 
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 Graph 11. 
(a)       











































































































Source: International Coffee Organization, The World Bank Group World Development Indicators, Food 
and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations: Statistics Department 
Source: International Coffee Organization, The World Bank Group World Development Indicators, 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations: Statistics Department 
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 Appendix A 
Causality from Vietnamese coffee exportation to ICO Composite Price 
 
A.1 Granger Causality Data 
 
X=Vietnam Coffee Exports (000US$); Y=ICO Composite Price 
 
Vietnamese Coffee Export Volume and ICO Composite Price 
 
Year       (Yt-Yt-1)        (Yt-1-Yt-2)        (Yt-2-Yt-3)        (Xt-Xt-1)        (Xt-1-Xt-2)        (Xt-2-Xt-3) 
                  Yt-1                 Yt-2                  Yt-3          Xt-1               Xt-2                    Xt-3 
  
1968         -0.4859           -0.0446              1.1232       0.0038 -0.0603                -0.0188 
1969    0.1920            -0.4859         -0.0446       0.0361  0.0038               -0.0603 
1970    0.1858             0.1920         -0.4859       0.3051  0.0361                 0.0038 
1971   -0.1567            0.1858          0.1920      -0.1160  0.3051                 0.0361 
1972    0.0389            -0.1567          0.1858       0.1288           -0.1160                  0.3051 
1973    1.7538             0.0389         -0.1567       0.2331  0.1288                -0.1160 
1974    0.0517             1.7538          0.0389       0.0931  0.2331                 0.1288 
1975   -0.0588            0.0517          1.7538       0.0556  0.0931                 0.2331 
1976    2.7500            -0.0588          0.0517       0.9791  0.0556                 0.0931 
1977   -0.5833            2.7500         -0.0588       0.6146  0.9791                 0.0556 
1978   -0.1000           -0.5833          2.7500      -0.3231  0.6146                 0.9791 
1979   -0.2889           -0.1000         -0.5833       0.0925 -0.3231                 0.6146 
1980    0.5100            -0.2889         -0.1000      -0.1111  0.0925                -0.3231 
1981   -0.3171            0.5100         -0.2889      -0.2340 -0.1111                 0.0925 
1982    0.3636            -0.3171          0.5100       0.0830 -0.2340                -0.1111 
1983    0.1111             0.3636         -0.3171       0.0238  0.0830                -0.2340 
1984    0.1600             0.1111          0.3636       0.1032  0.0238                 0.0830 
1985    1.3793             0.1600          0.1111      -0.0573  0.1032                 0.0238 
1986    3.4546             1.3793          0.1600       0.2842 -0.0573                 0.1032 
1987   -0.1865            3.4546          1.3793      -0.3693   0.2842               -0.0573 
1988    0.1609            -0.1865          3.4546       0.0756  -0.3693                0.2842 
1989    0.3953             0.1609         -0.1865      -0.2095   0.0756               -0.3693 
1990    0.1418             0.3953          0.1609      -0.2197  -0.2095                0.0756 
1991   -0.1756            0.1418          0.3953      -0.0661  -0.2197               -0.2095 
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 1992    0.1999            -0.1756          0.1418      -0.2013  -0.0661               -0.2197 
1993    0.2132             0.1999         -0.1756       0.1552  -0.2013               -0.0661 
1994    1.9550             0.2132          0.1999       1.1816   0.1552               -0.2013 
1995    0.8171             1.9550          0.2132       0.0295   1.1816                0.1552 
1996   -0.2953            0.8171          1.9550      -0.2626   0.0295                1.1816 
1997    0.1846            -0.2953          0.8171       0.3119  -0.2626                0.0295 
1998    0.1935             0.1846         -0.2953      -0.1864   0.3119               -0.2626 
1999   -0.0150            0.1935          0.1846      -0.2133  -0.1864                0.3119 
2000   -0.1458          -0.0150          0.1935      -0.2505  -0.2133               -0.1864 
2001   -0.2168          -0.1458         -0.0150      -0.2903  -0.2505               -0.2133 
2002   -0.1764          -0.2168         -0.1458       0.0472  -0.2903               -0.2505 
2003    0.5665           -0.1764         -0.2168       0.0871   0.0472               -0.2903 
2004    0.2696            0.5665         -0.1764       0.1975   0.0871                0.0472 
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 A.2 STATA Robust OLS Regression 
 
. regress GICOprice GICOprice_lag1 GICOprice_lag2 GVietnamexport_lag1 
GVietnamexport_lag2, robust 
 
GYt = α + a1GYt-1 + a2GYt-2 + b1GXt-1 + b2GXt-2 
 
Linear regression                                                                   
Number of obs =      37 
                                                            F(  4,    32) =    0.60 
                                                                 b > F      =  0.6678 
                                                   R-squared     =  0.0563 
                                                                      Root MSE      =  .33662 
 
                                                        Robust 
GICOprice                Coef.             Std. Err.          t          P>|t|           [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
GICOprice_~1          .1669969       .1898713        0.88     0.386         -.2197583     .553752 
GICOprice_~2         -.0477248       .1663265      -0.29      0.776        -.3865208    .2910712 
GVietnamex~1        -.0242984       .0782956      -0.31      0.758        -.1837813    .1351845 
GVietnamex~2        -.0627301       .0621745      -1.01      0.321        -.1893754    .0639152 
_cons                         .0789892       .064487         1.22      0.230        -.0523664    .2103448 
 
A.3 STATA Variance and Covariance Calculations for Use in T-Test 
 
. correlate, _coef cov 
 
                                  GICOpr~1         GICOpr~2         GVietn~1       GVietn~2         _cons 
 
GICOprice_~1          .036051 
GICOprice_~2         -.002708            .027665 
GVietnamex~1        -.007945            -.00117               .00613 
GVietnamex~2        -.000996            -.005373             .000617           .003866 




Z1 = b1+b2 = 0                        – 0       -.0242984 - .0627301 
                      t = __________________ = ____________________________ = -0.8212 
                  se( )               .1059716943 
 
where se( ) = [Var ]1/2 = [Var(  + 2cov  + Var ]1/2  
       = [.00613 + 2(.000617) + .003866]1/2 = [.01123]1/2 = .1059716943 
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 Appendix B 
Causality from ICO Composite Price to Vietnamese coffee exportation 
 
B.1 Granger Causality Data 
See above data in appendix A.1. X=Vietnam Coffee Exports (000US$); Y=ICO 
Composite Price  
 
B.2 STATA Robust OLS Regression 
GXt = α + c1GXt-1 + c2GXt-2 + d1GYt-1 + d2GYt-2 
 
. regress GVietnamexport GVietnamexport_lag1 GVietnamexport_lag2 GICOprice_lag1 
GICOprice_lag2, robust 
 
Linear regression                                                         
Number of obs =      37 
                                                                 F(  4,    32) =    1.84 
                                                      Prob > F      =  0.1462 
                                                     R-squared     =  0.0372 
                                                    Root MSE      =  .89822 
 
 
                                               Robust 
GVietnamex~t            Coef.             Std. Err.         t           P>|t|          [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
GVietnamex~1         -.0487753        .253131       -0.19      0.848       -.5643863    .4668357 
GVietnamex~2         -.1157751        .1230982     -0.94      0.354       -.3665179    .1349677 
GICOprice_~1           .2404705        .5481534      0.44      0.664       -.8760815    1.357022 
GICOprice_~2          -.2381764        .3369078     -0.71     0.485        -.9244353    .4480824 
_cons                          .4038822        .1526087      2.65      0.013         .0930283     .714736 
 
B.3 STATA Variance and Covariance Calculations for Use in T-Test 
  
. correlate, _coef cov 
 
                                 GVietn~1         GVietn~2        GICOpr~1        GICOpr~2          _cons 
 
GVietnamex~1         .064075 
GVietnamex~2        -.008417           .015153 
GICOprice_~1        -.105933            .017175             .300472 
GICOprice_~2         .031696           -.03354              -.084761           .113507 
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 B.4 Computations  
      – 0    .2404705 - .2381764 
Z2 = d1+d2 = 0       t = __________________ = ____________________________ = 0.0046 
     se( )              .4944259297 
 
 
where se( ) = [Var ]1/2 = [Var(  + 2cov  + Var ]1/2  
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 Appendix C 
Post-ICA Granger Causality Analysis 
 
C.1 Causality from Vietnamese Coffee Exportation to ICO Composite Price 
 
. regress GICOprice GICOprice_lag1 GICOprice_lag2 GVietnamexport_lag1 
GVietnamexport_lag2, robust 
 
GYt = α + a1GYt-1 + a2GYt-2 + b1GXt-1 + b2GXt-2 
 
Linear regression                                                         
Number of obs =      14 
                                                                  F(  4,     9) =    0.53 
                                                                           Prob > F      =  0.7153 
                                                                          R-squared     =  0.1097 
                                                           Root MSE      =   .4321 
 
                                  Robust 
GICOprice           Coef.      Std. Err.          t          P>|t|            [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
GICOprice_~1         .2575647       .6395155        0.40      0.697         -1.18912     1.704249 
GICOprice_~2        -.5282056       .5715245      -0.92      0.379         -1.821084    .7646727 
GVietnamex~1       -.0350061       .4148301      -0.08      0.935         -.9734171    .9034048 
GVietnamex~2        .2420801       .3479887        0.70      0.504         -.5451251    1.029285 
_cons                      -.0153595       .1423496       -0.11      0.916        -.3373767    .3066577 
 
. correlate, _coef cov 
 
                                  GICOpr~1       GICOpr~2        GVietn~1       GVietn~2            _cons 
 
GICOprice_~1            .40898 
GICOprice_~2           -.004973             .32664 
GVietnamex~1          -.248742          -.049814          .172084 
GVietnamex~2            .066369         -.183647         -.015169          .121096 
_cons                           .066713           .014505          -.044778          -.002591         .020263 
 
Computations: 
Z1 = b1+b2 = 0               – 0        -.0350061 + .2420801 
        t = __________________ = ____________________________ = 0.404 
     se( )                     .51268 
 
where se( ) = [Var ]1/2 = [Var(  + 2cov  + Var ]1/2 
          = [.172084 + 2(-.015169) + .121096]1/2 = [.262842]1/2 = .51268 
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 C.2 Causality from ICO Composite Price to Vietnamese Coffee Exportation 
 
GXt = α + c1GXt-1 + c2GXt-2 + d1GYt-1 + d2GYt-2 
 
. regress GVietnamexport GVietnamexport_lag1 GVietnamexport_lag2 GICOprice_lag1 
GICOprice_lag2, robust 
 
Linear regression                                                         
Number of obs =      14 
                                                                 F(  4,     9) =    3.02 
                                                             Prob > F      =  0.0779 
                                                             R-squared     =  0.3698 
                                                            Root MSE      =  .55783 
 
                                                          Robust 
GVietnamex~t             Coef.        Std. Err.           t         P>|t|           [95% Conf. Interval] 
  
GVietnamex~1         -.4827336      .5417448       -0.89     0.396        -1.708246    .7427783 
GVietnamex~2          .1804349      .4431983        0.41      0.693        -.8221493    1.183019 
GICOprice_~1          1.443071       .8619732        1.67      0.128       -.5068483    3.392989 
GICOprice_~2         -.4213448       .7615072      -0.55      0.594        -2.143994    1.301304 
_cons                         .2954999       .2047185       1.44      0.183        -.1676055    .7586053 
 
. correlate, _coef cov 
 
                       GVietn~1         GVietn~2        GICOpr~1      GICOpr~2           _cons 
 
GVietnamex~1         .293487 
GVietnamex~2         .00677             .196425 
GICOprice_~1         -.437533          .087477            .742998 
GICOprice_~2         -.110164         -.320654           -.000417          .579893 




Z2 = d1+d2 = 0      – 0     1.443071 - .4213448 
        t = __________________ = ____________________________ = 0.8886 
     se( )               1.149807375 
 
 
                
where se( ) = [Var ]1/2 = [Var(  + 2cov  + Var ]1/2 
       = [.742998 + 2(-.000417) + .579893]1/2 = [1.322057]1/2 = 1.149807375 
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 Appendix D 
 
D.1 Labor Productivity Data 
 
Colombian and Vietnamese Labor Productivity 
 
                    Colombia              Vietnam 
Year       Agriculture Value Added                     Agriculture Value Added 
  per worker (constant 2000 US$)              per worker (constant 2000 US$) 
 
 
1985      2599.908048         209.0801699 
1986      2693.270866       209.9914798 
1987      2877.770331       202.4222486 
1988      2975.278818       204.6078737 
1989      3127.260605       213.5519233 
1990      3341.260745       210.4735516 
1991      3472.545684       210.9842621 
1992      3400.703724       221.3623725 
1993      3504.185806       224.6287443 
1994      2715.617769       228.4288468 
1995      2814.725835       235.8577393 
1996      2778.466324       242.9699018 
1997      2796.528905       250.3177672 
1998      2799.114023       256.4708048 
1999      2800.786246       267.0655904 
2000      2688.187007       276.5320571 
2001      2683.187007       281.1130901 
2002      2695.126453       289.0702896 
2003      2779.228029       295.7341886 
2004      2847.460843       304.7876375 
2005      2913.932274       313.2078420 
Source: The World Bank Group World Development Indicators 
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 D.3 Labor Productivity Growth 
Growth in Labor Productivity in Colombia and Vietnam 
   
Colombia    Vietnam 
Year*   Growth in Agriculture   Growth in Agriculture  
          Value Added per worker (%)       Value Added per worker (%) 
 
 
1985    3.591004587     0.435866241  
1986    6.850386573    -3.60454203 
1987    3.388334548     1.079735602 
1988    5.108152754     4.371312545 
1989    6.843054262    -1.441509705 
1990    3.929203665     0.242648294 
1991    -2.068855719     4.918902595 
1992    3.042960829     1.475576788 
1993    -22.50360229     1.691725839 
1994    3.649558759     3.252169152 
1995    -1.288207561     3.015445896 
1996    0.650091757     3.024187511 
1997    0.092440246     2.458090647 
1998    0.059741167     4.130990896 
1999    -4.018268758     3.544622391 
2000    -0.188082727     1.656601074 
2001    0.444972565     2.830604388 
2002    3.120505772     2.305286717 
2003    2.455099515     3.061346726 
2004    2.334410706     2.762646328 
Source: The World Bank Group World Development Indicators 
* Each year represents the growth between the stated year and the following year [e.g.(xt–xt-1)/xt-1) 
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D.4 Graphical Comparison of Labor Productivity Growth 
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added per worker (percent)
Growth in Vietnam Agriculture value











Source: The World Bank Group World Development Indicators 
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 Appendix E 
Classical Model Analysis 
 
      Labor ProductivityVietnam           wVietnam 
  ____________________________________
     >      _____________ 
    Labor ProductivityColombia                  wColombia 
   
Labor Productivity and Wage Determination of Export Market Domination 
    (A)    (B)   
                     Labor ProductivityVietnam                  wageVietnam          _ 
Year      Labor ProductivityColombia            wageColombia            (A) – (B)* 
1985          0.08041829       1.46884565            -1.3895274 
1986          0.07796894         1.09447939            -1.0165105 
1987          0.07033996       2.00225494            -1.9319150 
1988          0.06876831       0.93628639            -0.8675171 
1989          0.06828722       0.73640977            -0.6681226 
1990          0.06299226       0.67586777            -0.6128755 
1991          0.06075781       0.54562270            -0.4848649 
1992          0.06509311       0.56538585            -0.5002927 
1993          0.06410298       0.69234222            -0.6282392 
1994          0.08411672       0.96420716            -0.8800904 
1995          0.08379421       0.95637765            -0.8725834 
1996          0.08744749       0.61912832            -0.5316808 
1997          0.08951017       0.42436382            -0.3348537 
1998          0.09162571       0.64350399            -0.5518783 
1999          0.09535379       0.58670654            -0.4913527 
2000          0.10286721       0.35410784            -0.2512406 
2001          0.10476836       0.26172754            -0.1569592 
2002          0.10725667       0.34603891            -0.2387822 
2003          0.10640875       0.57754564            -0.4711369 
2004          0.10703839       0.42801956            -0.3209812 
2005          0.10748631       0.40235373             -0.294867 
Source: The World Bank Group’s World Development Indicators, International Coffee 
Organization  
*Note: the negative values of (A) – (B) indicate that Colombia, not Vietnam, should dominate the 
world coffee export market. 
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 Appendix F 
Cost Competitiveness for Vietnam 
 
F.1 Data Components of the regression equation 
XMS and RULC Data 
 
 
Year           XMS         W/E                   eQ/N          ULC           RULC 
 
 
1985        0.00127518        91.5016667       209.08017      19131.18401       0.76134937 
1986        0.004221         95.5416667      209.99148      20062.93596       0.55521666 
1987        0.00510277        156.87        202.422249     31753.97814       0.90072028 
1988        0.00583884        70.1575        204.607874     14354.77690       0.42178983 
1989        0.00896637        54.5366667       213.551923     11646.41006      0.33090394 
1990        0.01320452        46.9908333       210.473552     9890.327586      0.28084221 
1991        0.01150466        36.6258333       210.984262     7727.474420      0.21934086 
1992        0.01707245        30.8875        221.362372     6837.330280       0.24321829 
1993        0.01918129        34.7025        224.628744     7795.178997       0.29259136 
1994        0.030418129      82.9258333       228.428847     18942.65248      0.52849920 
1995        0.04850753       94.7483333       235.857739      22347.12770      0.52235757 
1996        0.040351        57.84                 242.969902       14053.37912      0.35582551 
1997        0.03766655       55.8791667       250.317767      13987.54823      0.25093570 
1998        0.0496488        65.6116667       256.470805      16827.47696      0.38691074 
1999        0.0597665        50.6816667       267.065590      13535.32923      0.36746700 
2000        0.05905979       26.5433333       276.532057       7340.082570     0.24075827 
2001        0.07199897       15.12        281.113090       4250.429923     0.18176238 
2002        0.06336321       18.1416667       289.070290      5244.216838      0.24525737 
2003        0.08840501       27.92        295.734189      8256.898546      0.40295929 
2004        0.09045975      26.0375        304.787638      7935.908112      0.30190247 
Sources: International Coffee Organization, The World Bank Group World Development 
Indicators, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: Statistics Department 
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 F.2 STATA Regression Results for Vietnam 
Specific Regression Model: 
log(XMS) = α1log(RULCt) + α2log(RULCt-1) + α3log(RULCt-2) + vk 
 
. regress logXMSv logRULCv logRULCv_lag1 logRULCv_lag2 
 
  Source                 SS           df            MS                  Number of obs =      18  
           F(  3,    14) =    3.60 
  Model            6.37444653            3          2.12481551              Prob > F      =  0.0406 
  Residual        8.25265828           14        .589475591                      R-squared     =  0.4358 
               Adj R-squared =  0.3149 
  Total             14.6271048            17        .86041793             Root MSE      =  .76777 
 
 
logXMSv              Coef.        Std. Err.        t           P>|t|        [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
logRULCv            -.5304175      .579216       -0.92        0.375      -1.772712    .7118773 
logRULCv_lag1         .1262881     .6737602       0.19        0.854      -1.318784       1.57136 
logRULCv_lag2      -1.295814       .5300737      -2.44       0.028      -2.432709    -.1589188 
_cons                       -5.330354       .6569586       -8.11      0.000         -6.73939   -3.921318 
 
 
. test (logRULCv=0) (logRULCv_lag1=0) (logRULCv_lag2=0) 
 
( 1)  logRULCv = 0 
( 2)  logRULCv_lag1 = 0 
( 3)  logRULCv_lag2 = 0 
            F(  3,    14) =    3.60 
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 Appendix G 
Cost Competitiveness for Colombia 
 
G.1 Data Components of the regression equation 
XMS and RULC Data 
 
 
Year          XMS  W/E            eQ/N             ULC   RULC 
 
 
1985      0.16129366        62.2483333        2599.90805      161839.9428      6.44062271 
1986      0.20518667        87.2941667        2693.28087      235106.8358      6.50745953 
1987      0.16843407       78.3466667        2877.77033       225463.7129      6.39541090 
1988      0.16501347       74.9316667        2975.27882      222942.6006      6.55077552 
1989      0.16869129        74.0575        3127.26060      231597.1022      6.58025883 
1990      0.20196961        69.5266667       3341.26074      232306.7220      6.59649880 
1991      0.20163903        67.1266667       3472.54568      233100.4166      6.61644979 
1992      0.23512948        54.6308333       3400.70372      185783.2784      6.60870397 
1993      0.19752966        50.1233333       3504.18581      175641.4732      6.59268739 
1994      0.18483909        86.0041667       2715.61777       233554.4432     6.51615909 
1995      0.14953039        99.07        2814.72584       278854.8885     6.51815143 
1996      0.15152263        93.4216667       2778.46632       259568.9548     6.57217429 
1997      0.17106377        131.6775        2796.52890       368239.934       6.60620045 
1998      0.15824341        101.96        2799.11402       285397.6658     6.56209027 
1999      0.13533032        86.3833333       2800.78625       241941.2519     6.56839780 
2000      0.12640059        74.9583333       2688.24313       201506.2244     6.60950200 
2001      0.14140649        57.77        2683.18701       155007.7134     6.62864021 
2002      0.15360196        52.4266667       2695.12645       141296.4962     6.60804249 
2003      0.14212054        48.3425        2779.22803       134354.8310     6.55688413 
2004      0.13558858        60.8325        2847.46084       173218.1617     6.58966688 
Sources: International Coffee Organization, The World Bank Group World Development 
Indicators, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: Statistics Department 
 
54
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 6 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol6/iss1/6
 G.2 STATA Regression Results for Colombia 
Specific Regression Model: 
log(XMS) = α1log(RULCt) + α2log(RULCt-1) + α3log(RULCt-2) + vk 
 
. regress logXMSc logRULCc logRULCc_lag1 logRULCc_lag2 
 
Source        SS         df         MS                 Number of obs =      18 
                   F(  3,    14) =    0.31 
Model     .02943561          3       .00981187               Prob > F      =  0.8175 
Residual    .442382842       14       .031598774                  R-squared     =  0.0624 
                       Adj R-squared = -0.1385 
Total      .471818453       17      .027754027             Root MSE      =  .17776 
 
 
logXMSc                Coef.       Std. Err.           t           P>|t|         [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
logRULCc               -.4828017       5.882221        -0.08      0.936      -13.09891    12.13331 
logRULCc_lag1      5.62824          6.22384           0.90      0.381         -7.72057    18.97705 
logRULCc_lag2     -3.455862        5.228506        -0.66      0.519      -14.66989    7.758169 
_cons        -4.991919        11.74741        -0.42      0.677        -30.1876    20.20376 
 
 
. test (logRULCc=0) (logRULCc_lag1=0) (logRULCc_lag2=0) 
 
( 1)  logRULCc = 0 
( 2)  logRULCc_lag1 = 0 
( 3)  logRULCc_lag2 = 0 
       F(  3,    14) =    0.31 
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